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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 20060919-CA

vs.

RICHARD W. HIGHT, JR.,
Defendant / Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in ordering Hight to pay restitution for

missing items that cannot be linked to him? "Under usual circumstances, '[a]n
appellate court will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it exceeds
that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion."' State v. Mast, 2001 UT
App 402, f7, 40 P.3d 1143 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Breeze, 2001
UT App 200, p, 29 P.3d 19). However, this Court reviews "a trial court's
interpretation of restitution statutes for correctness." State v. Bickley, 2002 UT
App 342, p, 60 P.3d 582 (citing Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at fJ).

1

This issue was preserved in a written objection to the State's request for
restitution (R. 40), and in oral argument at the restitution hearing (R. 57: 49-51,
52-53).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the
Appellant's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Richard Hight appeals from the restitution order of the Fourth District

Court.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Richard Hight was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on

or about February 3, 2006 with burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202; possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii); and criminal mischief, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2)( c)(d) (R. 2-1).
On February 25, 2006 Hight entered guilty pleas to burglary, a third degree
felony; possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony; and
criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor (R. 27-20, 30-29). In the statement
2

before pleading guilty Hight acknowledged entering into a building with intent to
commit a theft, that he was in possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
and that he damaged the property of another person (R. 26). The factual basis for
the charge as stated by counsel for the State was: "On or about January 30,
2006... defendant broke into a home through a window intending to commit a
theft of marijuana. The defendant in fact stole a stash of marijuana, and other
items throughout the home were also discovered missing" (R. 57: 10). Hight
admitted to the factual basis (Id.). The trial court followed up with: "[I]s this the
case where you stole the marijuana and the owner of the marijuana then called the
police because the home had been broken into and made a claim on the pack, the
backpack that had the marijuana in it and then got arrested. Is that right?" (R. 57:
11). Hight answered, "Yes, Your Honor" (Id.).
On March 29, 2006 Hight was placed on probation for 36 months,
sentenced to 120 days in the Utah County Jail, and was ordered to pay afine(R.
35-32).
On May 26, 2006 the State filed a motion for restitution asking that the
court order Hight to pay $2500 in restitution (R. 38-37). Hightfiledan objection
to the State's request (R. 40).
On August 16, 2006 a restitution hearing was held and Hight was ordered
to pay $2650 in restitution (R. 53-52).
On September 13, 2006 Hight filed a notice of appeal in regards to the
order of restitution in Fourth District Court (R. 55).
3

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On January 30, 2006 Hight broke a window and unlawfully entered the
residence of Kory Tippetts. He cut his arm in the process and stole some
marijuana (R. 26, PSI at 3). Police noticed the only room that was disturbed was
Tippetts (PSI at 3).
Kory Tippetts initially told police that only marijuana was taken (PSI at 3).
The marijuana was recovered. Tippetts identified it at the police station as
belonging to him, and he was arrested (PSI at 3). In his victim impact statement,
however, Tippetts alleged that other items were missing including a silver dollar
collection and an Olympic watch (PSI at 5). He said he recontacted police and
reported these items missing (Id.). He requested $2500 in restitution (Id.).
A restitution hearing was held on August 16, 2006 and the following
testimony was taken:
Boyd Tippetts lives at 98 West 1780 North in Orem (R. 57: 29). On
January 30, 2006 his home was burglarized (Id.). The back window in the garage,
which measures 4 by 5 feet was smashed (Id.). He testified that he had a mylar
windsurf sail that was sitting in a storage bag underneath the window and that the
glass "cut that up" (R. 57:29). The cost to repair the window was $300. He
testified the mylar sail was not repairable (R. 57: 29). A new sail would be
approximately $980 while a used one would be about $550 (R. 57: 29-30).
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5

$100 for the re-keying; $200 for the coin collection; and $250 towards lost wages
(R. 57: 54-55).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Hight asserts that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the restitution
statute, and abused its discretion by ordering him to pay restitution for alleged
pecuniary damages where there was no firm establishment or clear causality that
he was responsible for those damages, and where he did not admit to such conduct
or agree to make restitution for those alleged damages as part of a plea agreement.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred In Its Interpretation of the Restitution
Statute and Abused Its Discretion in Its Award of Restitution.
When an individual is convicted of criminal activity that results in

pecuniary damages, the trial court must order the defendant to make restitution to
the victims subject to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201. See,
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-20l(4)(a). This applies to any offense for which the
defendant is convicted, or for which he admits responsibility for, or for which he
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. Utah Code Annotated
§§ 76-3-201(l)(b), 201(4)(a). See also, State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,ffij89, 60 P.3d 458; and State v Watson, 1999 UT App 273, \ 3, 987 P.2d 1289.
"However, a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal
activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted,
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dollars, and a watch (R. 57: 33-35). However, there was no admission i i,|L nu>
iii\ nl lliese items by Hight. There was no agreement that he pay restitution for
any of these items Ii iJiiilii i» llin u w in un i u d u i a 'which clearly established
causality or responsibility on the part of Hight foi
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Judge Davis' award of restitution for the broken window, floor
replacement, mylar sail and lost wages was appropriate and adequately established
by Hight's admissions to entering the home unlawfully by breaking a window,
which resulted in a cut on his arm and blood spatter on the hardwood floor.
However, the trial court's award of $250 for the watch, $100 for the rekeying, and
$200 for the coin collection constitutes an abuse of discretion because it was not
based on admissions by Hight, on any agreement to pay restitution. Nor was
liability for these missing items clear as a matter of law, or responsibility for these
items firmly established. In other words, the trial court's award of restitution for
these three items was based on inferences not supported by the facts or Hight's
admissions of wrongdoing. See Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^ 5.
Accordingly, Hight asks that this Court reduce the trial court's award of
restitution by $550 dollars.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Hight asks that this Court reduce the trial court's award of restitution in this
matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of April, 2007.

Margaret ¥. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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76-3-201

Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-201. Definitions-Sentences or combination of sentences
allowed- Civil penalties-Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person
could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as
further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as
a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
©
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(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution
as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant
to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation
expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant
is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
©
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76-3-201

(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be
calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to
resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which
he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the
extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the defendant
to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the county
correctional facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the county
correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility through a
contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 6413c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility as a
condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8).
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are:
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs
established under Section 64-13c-302;~ and
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated
reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2).
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred by
the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate
©
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qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental
health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered restitution
under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided under Subsections 7738a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv).
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsection
(6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the
defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
(7)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, except as provided in
Subsection (8).
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in
writing, it shall befiledwith the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior
to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation officer's report, other
reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced
at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for imposing the
upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(8)(a) The defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in prison if the trier of fact
finds that:
(i) during the commission of any of the following offenses the defendant causes substantial
bodily injury to the child:
(A) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnapping;
(B) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child;
©
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(C) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child; or
(D) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child; or
(ii) at the time of the commission of any of the offenses in Subsections (8)(a)(i)(A) through
(D), the defendant had been previously convicted of:
(A) Section 76-5-402, rape;
(B) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child;
(C) Section 76-5-402.2, object rape;
(D) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child;
(E) Subsection 76-5-403(2), forcible sodomy;
(F) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child;
(G) Section 76-5-404, forcible sexual abuse;
(H) Section 76-5-404.1, sexual abuse of a child and aggravated sexual abuse of a child;
(I) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(J) any offense in any other state or federal jurisdiction which constitutes or would
constitute a crime in Subsections (8)(a)(ii)(A) through (I); or
(K) the attempt to commit any of the offenses in Subsections (8)(a)(ii)(A) through (J),
(b) This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
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